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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
S T A T E O F U T A H , by and through
its R O A D C O M M I S S I O N ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
W . R O Y B R O W N and E V E L Y N J.
B R O W N , his wife; V A L L E Y B A N K
& TRUST COMPANY; ZIONS
BANK & TRUST; SOUTHLAND
C O R P O R A T I O N (7-11 Stores),
Defendants and Respondents.

I Case No.
13742

B R I E F OF RESPONDENTS
W . R O Y B R O W N and E V E L Y N J . B R O W N
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State
Road Commission to acquire certain real property belonging to W . Roy Brown and Evelyn J . Brown and
leased by Southland Corporation (7-11 Stores) located
on 5300 South at approximately 500 West, Salt Lake
County, for the purpose of constructing an expressway
thereon.
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
The case was tried before a jury, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. The jury returned a
verdict of $62,840.76 in favor of the land owners, Respondents herein, and $15,767.00 in favor of the lessee
of the premises.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents W . Roy Brown and Evelyn J . Brown, his wife, seek affirmation on the trial
court verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the state has omitted certain relevant facts
from its statement, the following is submitted by way
of background and clarification. Respondents Brown
purchased the property which is the subject of the
state's condemnation in 1964 after Brown had entered
into a long term lease with the Southland Corporation
(hereinafter sometimes called 7-11). (T. 148). Brown
improved the property substantially and then constructed a building specifically in accordance with the specifications of 7-11. The building was the distinctive design of 7-11 stores: brick construction, terrazzo floors
and the entry and exit being across the front of the
store. (T. 149). Prior to the take by the state the access
(over two hundred & fifty feet along 5300 South) to
the property was unlimited. After the take the access
was reduced to one 30 foot driveway on the east and one
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50 foot joint driveway on the west. The front parking
area was substantially reduced and there was a significant change in grade with the roadway being higher than
the level of the blacktop in front of the 7-11 store. All
of these factors made it impossible for 7-11 to carry on
the operation of their store and they cancelled their
lease.
At the time of the take by the state, Brown's lease
with Couthland Corporation had 11 years and 2 months
to run on the primary term and also contained a provision for two-5 year options. From the time 7-11 vacated
the premises up to trial the Respondents Brown had
only been able to rent the property for 2% months for a
rent of $100.00 per month. (T. 149).
Brown testified to a damage figure of $120,000.00
(T. 154). H e also testified that his property was more
valuable because of the lease with the Southland Corporation.
Mr. Charles Saxton (a former appraiser for the
state) the expert witness for Respondents Brown, testified to a damage figure of $110,900.00 as a result of the
state's take. Saxton testified that in his opinion the
Brown's property was worth more because of the 7-11
lease than it would be without the lease.
The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $78,607.76 to cover both the damage to the landowner and
the lessee 7-11. The jury also apportioned the damage
at $62,840.76 for the landowner and $15,767.00 for the
lessee. I n addition, the jury awarded damages to 7-11
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on a supplemental verdict for personal property that
7-11 had located at the subject premises.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY
T H E T R I A L COURT A N D T H E INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY I T W E R E
P R O P E R AND D I D NOT R E S U L T I N
A N A W A R D TO D E F E N D A N T
LANDOWNERS BROWN W H I C H EXCEEDED J U S T COMPENSATION.
Respondents Brown joins with Respondent the
Southland Corporation in urging the argument set
forth in Point Number I of its brief and adopt the provisions of the said Point as it is applicable to this Respondent.
In further support of its Point I these Respondents
submit that it was the state who selected and determined
the parties to be joined in this action. Further, it should
be noted that no motions were made by the state for
separate trials with respect to the landowner and the
lessee.
I n Point I of its brief on appeal, the Road Commission urges this Court to adopt the positions that it
was error to admit evidence of the value of various
estates or ownership interests in the condemned property in assessing the amount of compensation to be
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awarded in the present condemnation proceeding. The
above argument and request can only be made in disregard of the provisions of Section 78-34-10(1) of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which deals with "Compensation and Damages—How Determined" in condemnation proceedings. The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The above instruction from the legislature requires
that each and every separate estate or interest should be
valued in arriving at a figure that would represent just
compensation to the condemnees. Obviously, if the jury
is to perform its statutory duty, it must hear evidence
of both the existence and the value of separate estates
or interests in the condemned property. Yet the Road
Commission ignores this clear statutory mandate in
favor of the laws of Colorado and New York, which
provide that ". . . a property is appraised as if it were
not subject to various ownership interests. . . ." (Appellant's brief at page 6.)
I n the two Colorado cases cited by the Road Com-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
mission in Point I of its brief, City of Sterling v. Plains
Investment Co., 511 P . 2d 512 (Colo. 1973), and Vivian
v. Board of Trustees of Colo. School of Mines, 383 P . 2d
801 (Colo. 1963), the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the market value of condemned property is to be
ascertained in one proceeding and then the award is to
be apportioned between lessor and lessee in a subsequent
and separate action. I n both cases, the Colorado Supreme Court bases its decision upon the provisions of
Section 50-1-6(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes
(Perm. Supp. 1967), which requires in pertinent part
as follows:
". . . if there is more than one person interested
as owner or otherwise in the property and they
are unable to agree upon the nature, extent, or
value of their respective interests in the total
amount of compensation so ascertained and assessed on an undivided basis by either a commission or jury, then the nature, extent, or
value of said interests shall thereupon be determined according to law in a separate and
subsequent proceeding and distribution made
among several claimants thereto." (Emphasis
added.)
The Road Commission further relies upon the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. State, 238 N . E . 2d
705 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1968) to support its argument in
favor of a procedure in which separate ownership interests are to be ignored in determining just compen-
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sation. As in Colorado, however, the New York Court
was bound by statutory provision to first find the market value of the condemned land, have the sum paid
into the court, and then apportion the award among the
various interests in a separate proceeding. Consolidated
Laws of New York, Volume 9A Condemnation Law §
22 (1950).
The Road Commission further argues that:
"[T]he most glaring error complained of in
this appeal is that Mr. Saxton [expert witness
of the Respondents Brown] was obviously allowed to tack on the value of the leasehold over
and above his own opinion of fair market value
of the subject property." Appellant's brief at
page 4.
Contrary to the above representation of the Road
Commission, there was no attempt by Mr. Saxton, or
any other witness, to tack on the value of the leasehold
over and above the fair market value of the property.
I t is true that Mr. Saxton opinioned that the existence of the lease to 7-11 made the property more valuable and he did figure in that increment of value in
determining the value of the whole. Under questioning Mr. Saxton testified that over the eleven-year life
of the lease, the Respondents Brown would have received fifty-three thousand six hundred dollars ($53,600) (T. 72-73). Mr. Saxton further testified that
with expenses deducted and then discounted to reflect
its present value, the lease was worth $33,687.25 at the
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time of the termination of the lease (Tr. 73). All risks
attendant to the production of this income had already
been taken and overcome by the Respondents Brown.
Through the condemnation, however, the Road Commission extinguished all benefits that the Respondents
Brown expected to receive under the contract; and
by this appeal, the Road Commission seeks to keep the
Browns from receiving any compensation for that loss.
I t is well established that an owner-lessor may receive the benefit of his lease in a condemnation action.
". . . [T]he lessor gets the present value of the
rents plus the value of the remainder of the
estate . . ." 29A C.J.S. "Eminent Domain" §
198. See also City of Ogden v. Stephens, 21 U.
2d 336, 445 P . 2d 703 (1968).
Nichols is in agreement that the award to an ownerlessor must include the present value of the rents reserved under a lease:
"Where premises subject to a lease are condemned the owner-lessor is generally entitled to
compensation for three elements; first, the
stream of income, or rents reserved under the
lease until the end of the term; second, any
benefits reserved to him under the lease;
third, any reversion of the property when the
term of the lease has run." (Emphasis added.)
7 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Revised Third
Edition (1973), § 11-02, p. 11-5.
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Clearly, the effect that a lease has on market value
will be considered by both a willing buyer and a willing
seller. The following expert opinion by Mr. Saxton remained uncontradicted at the trial:
". . . [T]he increment of value attributable to
that constant income over a period of many
years adds value to the land. In fact, the land
producing this kind of income becomes more
valuable, and we find that in the marketplace
many people, many prudent investors, would
pay much more for the property with the lease
on it than they would for the property with
just the building and the land because of this
increment of value which is attributable to the
income over a long period of time." (T. 66)
Even in the cases cited by the Road Commission to
bolster its argument that the interests of lessor and
lessee should be tried separately in accordance with the
laws of Colorado and New York, the courts commented
that the value of the rents or leases was relevant in determining the fair market value of the property in the
first proceeding. In addition, Mr. William L. Christensen, fee appraiser for the Road Commission, agreed that
a lease is relevant in determining fair market value.
(T. 262)
I t is clear that there was no error in admitting evidence of the value of the lease to the owner-lessor as an
element of the fair market value of the leased fee estate.
I t is also clear that the court submitted the case under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proper instruction: Instruction 10 "You are instructed
that just compensation includes all elements of value
that inhere in the property, but does not exceed market value" . . . (R. 11).
In its overzealous attempt to urge error the Road
Commission quotes part of counsel's closing argument
as evidence that the verdict was all a big misunderstanding. If the Road Commission felt any part of the argument was improper a timely objection should have been
made. I t is submitted, however, that taken in context and
in total and with the court's instructions the jury was in
no way misled by counsel for the Browns.
A further argument of the Road Commission in
Point I of its brief attacks not only the admissibility of
evidence of the value of a lease as it affects the value
of the fee estate, but also attacks the weight of that
evidence. The Road Commission argues generally and
theoretically that when contract rent under a lease is
below market rent the lease ceases to be a benefit and
becomes a liability of the owner-lessor. Analysis of this
argument reveals it to be as poorly founded as the Road
Commission's lack of authority suggests.
While it is evident that of two similar properties the
one commanding a higher rental will have a higher fair
market value in most cases, it does not follow that the
fair market value of the property commanding the
lower rent is diminished thereby in any way. The stability of the lease in question, coupled with the fact that
all risks attendant thereto had been taken and overcome
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and the fact that there is a limited supply of quality
lessees such as 7-11, all clearly support the testimony on
behalf of the lessor that the lease definitely had value and
the value of the fee was thereby enhanced.
Just because Southland Corporation had to pay
more to get another owner-lessor to construct a new
very specialized building in another location, it does not
follow that the lease in question was not a benefit to the
Respondents Brown, who had a building which, as a
practical matter, could be used for only one purpose,
i.e., a 7-11 Store. The findings of the jury are not contrary to any of the above testimony. In short, it was not
established that the lease of the Respondents Brown was
anything other than a valuable property right, and it
must be so regarded.
The Road Commission argues that somehow the
7-11 store on the subject property was more valuable
without a lease with Southland Corporation, while in
fact such a building without a lease is a liability. The
Road Commission ignores the fact that the figures presented by Mr. Saxton represented the present value
of the lease, and that a willing purchaser, after buying
the property subject to the lease, would receive, over
eleven years, the difference between the present value
of the lease ($33,600.00) and the eleven-year value
of the lease (53,600.00), a difference of approximately
$20,000.00. The Road Commission also ignores the
length of the lease, its stability, the identity of the
lessee (a corporation which has an impeccable credit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rating), and the fact that Mr. Brown had already
absorbed all of the risks inherent in entering into the
lease, and had only to reap the benefits (T. 54). Ignored
also is the specialty type of business for which the building was built. The Road Commission's argument also
ignores the testimony of one of the owner-lessors (Mr.
Brown) that he had been unable to lease the building
since the termination of the lease, except for only two
and one-half months and then only for $100.00 per
month, one-fourth the amount per month that the property had received under the lease (T. 149, 58). I t is
readily apparent that the Road Commission conveyed
no benefit upon the Browns by causing the loss of the
7-11 lease.
In conclusion of this point, it is clear that evidence
of the existence and the value of a lease is admissible
in order to prove the value of both the leasehold estate
and the leased fee estate. There is no doubt that constitutional, statutory, and case law demand examination
of all estates and interests in order to determine the
amount of just compensation. To deny such an examination would, under the facts of the present case, work
a harsh injustice to the Respondents Brown and would
defy the concept of just compensation.
POINT II
T H E R E W A S NO E R R O R I N D E N Y I N G T H E R O A I ) C O M M I S S I O N S MODigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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T I O N TO S T R I K E T H E T E S T I M O N Y
OF T H E D E F E N D A N T S ' E X P E R T
WITNESS.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence leaves the
admission of expert testimony to the sound discretion
of the trial judge, "which discretion should not be disturbed lightly or not at all, unless it clearly appears he
was in error". Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9
U. 2d 275, 342 P . 2d 1094 (1959) at 1097.
The Road Commission critizes Mr. Saxton's opinion that the raw land, absent improvements, should be
valued at $1.25 per square foot, arguing that this opinion was based in part on previous sales made to the Road
Commission for the same project in the same locality.
While the forced nature of such sales may or may not
have affected their reliability for use in determining the
fair market value, any error committed in reliance upon
such figures is harmless in view of the fact that Mr. Ray
Williams, expert witness for the Road Commission,
opined the same figure as being the value of unimproved
ground in that area (T. 324).
The Road Commission also complains about the
date used by Saxton in evaluating the lease. Although
Mr. Saxton's valuation of the lease was related to the
date of termination in August, 1973, rather than to the
date of the taking December 22, 1971, Mr. Saxton explained that to do otherwise would not have been a true
valuation (T. 72). The statutory valuation date was in
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1971. The tenant Southland Corporation, however, had
remained in the building until August of 1973, at which
time the lease was terminated as a result of the taking.
To have valued the lease from December of 1971 would
have added over $6000 to the value of the lease. In view
of the fact that the owner-lessors had received rentals
until the date of termination, it would not be right to
try to recover for damages not actually suffered. Since
any error in this regard could only work to the benefit
of the Road Commission, it is apparent that there was
no abuse of the discretion of the trial court in denying
the Road Commission's motion to strike on this ground.
Further complaint is made that Mr. Saxton based
his opinion of the value of the property in part on his
assumption that the entire property was subject to the
lease. The Road Commission points out in its brief,
however, that in fact only a portion of the property was
so encumbered. However, any mistake on this point can
only work in favor of the Road Commission. All of the
property actually taken by the Road Commission was
subject to the lease. The value of each square foot
actually taken was therefore higher than the value assigned by Mr. Saxton because the increment of value
represented by the lease would be applicable to fewer
square feet. Hence, if the view of the Road Commission
is taken, a higher value per square foot taken should be
assigned, resulting in a higher award to the condemnees.
Again, if there is an error at all, the outcome of that
error is favorable to the Road Commission.
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The Road Commission criticizes Mr. Saxton's consideration of the value of the lease as one of the elements
of the fair market value of the condemned property, and
claims that his testimony should be stricken on this
ground. As is illustrated in Point I, supra, Mr. Saxton's
consideration of the value of the lease merely evidences
his expertise in the field of real estate appraisal and
his understanding of Utah law.
In conclusion of this point, it is readily seen that
the Road Commission seeks to strike the testimony of
Mr. Saxton not on the basis of claimed prejudicial
mistakes, but because Mr. Saxton's testimony was adverse to the Road Commission's position that a lease
should be totally ignored in condemnation proceedings.
The error of the position taken by the Road Commission is illustrated in Point I, supra. Any other mistake
claimed by the Road Commission to have been made by
Mr. Saxton was actually a benefit to the Road Commission, and was not prejudicial in any way.
POINT III
T H E JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT
INCONSISTENT W I T H T H E EVIDENCE P R E S E N T E D AT TRIAL.
The jury awarded a total verdict to Respondents
W. Roy Brown and Evelyn J. Brown and to Respondent Southland Corporation of $78,607.76, which was
broken down as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fair market value of property
taken
Severance damage

$

25,229.76
53,378.00

$

78,607.76

Apportionment between lessors
and lessee:
W . Roy Brown and Evelyn J.
Brown (Leased fee estate) $
Southland Corporation
(Leasehold)

62,840.76

TOTAL

TOTAL

$

15,767.00
78,607.76

In Point I I I of its brief, the Road Commission
aigues for reversal on the ground that the amount of
severance damage awarded by the jury, $53,378.00,
was not sustained by the evidence presented. The Road
Commission's criticism of the jury's verdict is inaccurate and leads to the above erroneous conclusion. A review of the evidence shows clearly that the Road Commission's argument is based more on semantics than on
legal reasoning.
Mr. Saxton's testimony shows that in his opinion
the Respondents Brown alone were entitled to damages
in the sum of $110,900.00 (Tr. 61), which would sustain
a verdict well in excess of the $78,607.76 that the jury
returned for both Southland and the Browns to share
between them. Careful scrutiny of Mr. Saxton's testimony indicates he was breaking down severance damages
into two categories and that his testimony regarding
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such damages would support a verdict substantially
larger than that returned by the jury. Mr. Saxton initially included in his figure for the value of the land
taken ($65,833.74) the amount attributable to the loss
of the lease. Later during cross examination by the
Road Commission, at the urging of its counsel, he indicated that it could be included in severance (Tr. 104-105,
129). In addition, Mr. William L. Christensen, witness
for the Road Commission, characterized the loss of income as an item of severance damage (Tr. 259).
In any event, the owner of the property, Mr.
Brown, testified to a severance figure substantially in
excess of the jury's verdict (Tr. 154). The Utah
Supreme Court has accepted the testimony of owners
of land in determining values and damages for condemnation proceedings. State through Road Commission
v. Dillree, 25 U.2d 184, P.2d 507 (1970). In DUlree,
supra, the issue on appeal was whether the jury could
return a damage award based on the estimate of the
property owner, which was higher than the estimate of
the expert witness. The court held it could.
In the instant case, Mr. Roy Brown, the owner
of the property, testified that in his opinion the fair
market value of the Browns' estate before the taking
was $160,000.00 (Tr. 154). When asked about the
value of this interest after the taking and the consequential loss of the lease, Mr. Brown testified:
"Well, without the lease and without the
frontage, and without the parking and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entrance in the front—there's no entrance in
the side of that building at all—in my opinion
it's worth $40,000.00. (Tr. 154).
Mr. Brown's opinion of the total damage suffered by
the Respondents Brown, therefore, was $120,000, which
included both severance and the value of the property
taken. This clearly supports a verdict substantially
higher than that returned by the jury.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Road
Commission's objection to the jury's verdict is raised
for the first time in its brief on appeal. Counsel for the
Road Commission allowed the verdict to be entered
without objection and there was no motion for remittur
or for new trial.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no merit to the claims made
by the Road Commission in its brief on appeal. Although
the Road Commission objected to the admission of evidence of the existence of the lease and of the value of
the lease to both the lessor and the lessee, such an objection cannot stand in light of the requirement of Utah
law that the jury ascertain and assess in a single proceeding each and every separate estate or interest in
condemned property. I t is settled that the value of a
lease is a relevant factor in determining the fair market
value of property under condemnation. I t is further
submitted that the two-hearing approach advocated by
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
the Road Commission is not supported by Utah law. Nor
was there a timely request made to so separate the trials.
The evidence taken as a whole clearly supports the
verdicts and they were clearly not excessive. The jury
verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
W. E U G E N E H A N S E N
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents Brown
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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